The first difficulty when trying to evaluate with accuracy the video watermarking capacity is the lack of a reliable statistical model for the malicious attacks. The present paper brings into evidence that the attack effects in the DCT domain are stationary and computes the corresponding pdfs. In this respect, an in-depth statistical approach is deployed by combining Gaussian mixture estimation with the probability confidence limits. Further on, these pdfs are involved in capacity computation. The experimental results are obtained on a corpus of 10 video sequences (about 25 minutes each), with heterogeneous content.
INTRODUCTION
For property right identification purposes, the watermarking techniques insert a mark into some original media (e.g. a video). If the mark insertion does not result in visual artefacts, the method features transparency. If a pirate cannot eliminate the mark without damaging the marked video, the method features robustness (Cox & others, 2002) .
In practice, the better the robustness, the worse the transparency. In order to reach a balance between these two constraints, the mark is inserted into some spectral representations of the original data, e.g. in the DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) .
A crucial issue is to compute the watermarking capacity, i.e. the largest amount of information which can be inserted into a video, for prescribed transparency and robustness. The watermarking capacity is computed as the capacity of the noisy channel modelling the watermarking method, Figure 1 . According to this model, the mark is sampled from the information source. The detection is impaired by the noise sources: the original video itself and the attacks. The side information watermarking exploits the fact that the original video is known at the insertion but unknown at the detection. As such a noise source should not decrease the channel capacity (Costa, 1983) , the attacks remain the restricting factor and their intimate knowledge would grant accuracy in capacity evaluation. The present paper focuses on some real life attacks and models their effects in the DCT domain. Note that attack modelling is not a trivial task. Actually, any mathematical approach should properly answer at least the following questions: 1. The paper has the following structure. After having defined a set of random variables corresponding to the attack effects, Section 2 presents the statistical investigation procedure. Section 3 describes the experimental results. The capacity evaluation is dealt with in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendix summarises some theoretical bases. 
Attack Effect Representation
Be there an L frame colour video. Each frame is represented in the HSV space. The following steps are applied to each frame (Mitrea & others, 2006) 
Pdf Estimation for Attacks
There are many pdf estimation tools based on iid (independent and identically distributed) data, but thiey do not apply here. The noise vector is computed on successive (dependent) frames and the a priori lack of support for attack stationarity can raise suspicions about the data identical distribution. Hence, a general estimation procedure should be considered (Mitrea & others, 2007) 
If this procedure is successful when applied to an individual video (Section 3.1), then positive answers to the last two questions in the Introduction are obtained. A positive answer to the first question is obtained iff. the same model is obtained for different video sequences (Section 3.2).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The corpus contains 10 video sequences (64 Kbit/s), each of them of 35000 = L frames (about 25 minutes each). The content is heterogeneous, combining film, news, and home video excerpts.
The frame size is 80
The DCT is individually applied to whole frames, and the largest 360 = R coefficients are investigated.
Model Computation
The model is computed for an arbitrarily chosen video sequence. ) and the three attacks. For comparison, Figure 2 also represents (in dashed line) the Gaussian pdf with the same mean values and variances as the computed models.
The same results were obtained for each of the 10 video sequences in the corpus and for each investigated attack: the parameters were slightly different but the errors were lower than 0.05.
The models, for all 360 ranks and for other attacks (Frequency Model Laplacian Removal, median filtering, small rotations, JPEG compression) can be obtained by contacting the authors.
Model Validation
Up to now, the experimental results point to the existence of a model for the attack effects on a particular video sequence and estimate this model (i.e. elucidates the second & third questions in the Introduction). 
DCT DOMAIN VIDEO WATERMARKING -Attack Estimation and Capacity Evaluation
The model independence w.r.t. the video sequence and the estimation procedure is now to be investigated. First, it should be précised whether the model computed on a particular video sequence can be representative for the whole corpus or not. In this respect, the investigation algorithm is resumed on the rest of 9 video sequences from the corpus and the corresponding models are computed. The errors between the reference model and these new models are evaluated according to three criteria: the similarity measure in eq. (1), the Kullback-Leibler divergence and the Hellinger distance (Appendix). For each criterion, and for three ranks, the minimal, maximal, and average errors are reported in Table 2 . The numerical values obtained for the distance in eq. (1) ascertain a quite good accuracy (and generality) for the model provided in Table 1 : the average errors are acceptably low, with one exception, namely the Gaussian filtering. The Kullback-Leibler divergence and the Hellinger distance lead to acceptably small values for all the attacks. In order to compute these three measures, the following instantiations were made in eqs. (1) are the mixture mean and variance. Secondly, the concordance between the maximum likelihood estimation (which is the basis for the EM Gaussian mixture algorithm) and the popular confidence limit estimation is checked. Note that the EM Gaussian mixture estimation results in a continuous pdf while the confidence limit estimation provides values for the probability that a random variable takes values in a given interval, but not the pdf itself. Consequently, the interval where the Gaussian mixture model takes non-zero values is evenly divided into 10 sub-intervals. On the one hand, confidence limits for the probability that the noise effects would take values in these sub-intervals are derived. On the other hand, the integral of the Gaussian mixture model on the same sub-intervals are computed. The experiments bring into evidence that each and every time (i.e. for each type of investigated attack and for each rank) the integral on the EM Gaussian model belongs to the corresponding confidence limits.
This sub-section shows that an individual model (Table 1) , computed on a particular video sequence, is valuable for all the video sequences involved in the experiments and, moreover, that it does not depend on the estimation procedure. This means a positive answer to the first question in Introduction.
CAPACITY COMPUTATION
As discussed in Introduction, any side-information watermarking technique can be modelled by a noisy channel, where the mark is a sample from the information source and the noise is represented by the attacks. In order to evaluate the capacity of such a channel, the eqs. (A7) and (A8) are considered. For the capacity limits in eq. (A7), the noise power N is the variance of the noise vector, Section 2.2. The signal power P was derived from transparency constraints, so as to ensure a mark 30dB lower than the original (unmarked) coefficients. function giving the capacity value is searched for by means of a numerical strategy. Actually, it is considered that ) (x p X itself can be represented as a mixture of 5 Gaussian laws, thus restricting the searching to a space with 15 dimensions (5 weights, 5 means values and 5 variances). These 15 dimensions are not independent. First, the sum of weights should equal 1. Secondly, the mean of the mark (i.e. the mixture mean) is set to 0 (a generally accepted assumption in watermarking). Thirdly, the mixture variance was set so as to ensure a good transparency (i.e. 30dB lower than the host video).
The capacity values computed with the general formula and with Shannon limits are shown in Table 3 . A general agreement between the two types of capacity estimation can e noticed, with some exceptions (for 1 = r of Gaussian filtering, StirMark). At the same time, the capacity estimation starting from the attack models is compulsory when a certain degree of precision is required: that capacity evaluation by limits can lead at relative errors of about 100% and larger! 
CONCLUSIONS
The present paper brings into evidence that some real life watermarking attack effects are stationary in the DCT hierarchy and accurately estimates the corresponding probability density functions. Then, these models are involved in capacity evaluation.
From the applicative point of view, beyond watermarking itself (i.e. reaching the capacity limit in a practical application), these results are the starting point for a large variety of applications in the multimedia content processing, as smart indexing or in-band content enrichment, for instance.
Further work will be also devoted to considering the Blahut approach for watermarking capacity evaluation. Mitrea, M., Dumitru, O., Prêteux F, Vlad, A., 2007 
The number of mixtures K is pre-established by the experimenter and
are 3K parameters to be estimated by the EM (expectation maximisation) algorithm (Dempster & other, 1977) , based on a maximum likelihood criterion: the E step:
the M step:
where the ( i ) upper index denotes the current iteration; the total number of iterations is also subject to the experimenters choice.
The relationship among the parameters of the individual Gaussian laws and the mixture parameters is given in (Trailovic, Pao, 2002) .
Alongside with the similarity measure defined in eq. (1), two popular methods for pdf comparison are involved in the experiments (Basseville, 1996) : Kullback-Leibler divergence:
Hellinger distance:
A2 Capacity Evaluation Basis
The capacity of a continuous channel, whose input and output information sources are denoted by X and Y is given by the Shannon's formula ( 
where W is the channel bandwidth, P is the signal power, N is the noise power, and 1 N is the noise entropy power (i.e. the power of a white-type noise which has the same bandwidth and entropy as the considered noise).
When assuming the noise is additive and independent, eq. (A6) becomes: (Dumitru, & others, 2007) . 
